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The Role of Family in Mental Health Law:  A Framework for 
Transformation* 
 
Mary Donnelly and Claire Murray 
 
 
Abstract: 
This article explores the role of family in mental health law and aims to contribute to a 
better understanding of this role in two ways.  First, it places the current treatment of 
family in mental health legislation within a temporal and narrative context. In this, the 
article focuses on two jurisdictions, England and Wales, and Ireland, which provide an 
interesting contrast in approach. In England and Wales, the current treatment of family in 
the Mental Health Act 1983 is centred on the figure of the ‘nearest relative’ while the Irish 
Mental Health Act 2001 adopts a highly individualist approach, affording a very limited role 
to family. Secondly, the article develops a normative context for ongoing debates regarding 
the appropriate place for family in mental health law. It argues that the legislative 
frameworks in both jurisdictions discussed are outdated and inadequate and advocates an 
approach based on conceptions of relational autonomy and vulnerability which, it argues, 
offers more potential both in respect of people with mental illness and in respect of their 
family.  It also argues that this approach is in line with emerging jurisprudence under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and with the requirements of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
 
Introduction 
Across the developed world, mental health services have changed fundamentally in recent 
decades as the process of deinstitutionalization has moved the delivery of services away 
from the traditional ‘asylum’ and into the community.1 This shift in focus has contributed to 
                                                 
*  We are grateful for reviewers’ helpful comments. 
1 See P Bartlett and R Sandland, Mental Health Law, Policy and Practice (3rd Ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp 82-95; V Yeates, ‘Ambivalence, Contradiction and Symbiosis: Carers’ and Mental Health Users’ Rights’ 
(2007) 29 Law & Policy 435, 438-39. Similar patterns emerge in the United States see: J Petrila, ‘Rights-based 
Legalism and the Limits of Mental Health Law: The United States of America’s Experience’ in  B McSherry and P 
Weller eds, Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) and Australia: see T. 
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the development of a recovery-based model within which mental health is seen as more 
than relief of symptoms and the ‘multiple residential, vocational, educational, and social 
needs and wants’ of people with mental illness are recognized.2 However, the shift also 
takes place within the ‘hollowed out state’, where the practical implementation of neo-
liberal ideologies has led to decreased state involvement and established instead a sharing 
of responsibility for welfare between the state and non-state actors, including families and 
voluntary services.3 Thus, the realities of community-based mental health care have also 
included ongoing reduction in funding and reduced hospital beds, leading to limited access 
to services and treatment, including effective early stage intervention.4 Inadequate social 
support and continuing stigmatisation also mean that people with mental illness continue 
to suffer disproportionate levels of social marginalisation; unemployment; poor housing 
and homelessness.5 The impact of this is, very often, felt not just by the individual but also 
by his or her family. 
 
Current service delivery models have important consequences for people with mental 
illnesses and for their families. They also produce new challenges for mental health law. 
The classic paradigm of mental health law, focused solely on the relationship between the 
State and the individual, clearly fails to take account of the complex context in which 
services are now delivered. Given that, in many instances, families (and others) are also 
actors in the process of service delivery, the need for appropriate legal mechanisms to 
address their role in this respect must be addressed.  Yet, it is not a simple matter to write 
families into mental health legislation.  Family relationships are complex and families are 
                                                                                                                                                             
Carney,‘The Mental Health Service Crisis of Neoliberalism: An Antipodean Perspective’ (2008)  31 International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 101. 
2 W Anthony, ‘Recovery from Mental Illness: The Guiding Vision of the Mental Health Service System in the 
1990s’ (1993) 16 Psychosocial Rehabilitation Journal 11, 12. 
3 T Carney, ‘The Mental Health Service Crisis of Neoliberalism: An Antipodean Perspective’ (2008) 31 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 101, 102. 
4 See S Ramon, ‘Neoliberalism and its Implications for Mental Health in the UK’ (2008) 31 International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry 116; on the similar consequences in Australia and the United States, see Carney ibid and J. 
Petrila ‘Rights-based Legalism and the Limits of Mental Health Law: The United States of America’s Experience’ 
in B McSherry and P Weller eds, Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
5 See P Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law’ 
(2012) 75 MLR 752, 760.  On the pervasive effect of stigmatisation, see G. Thornicroft, Shunned: Discrimination 
Against People with Mental Illness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); S. Hinshaw, The Mark of Shame: 
Stigma of Mental Illness and an Agenda for Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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infinitely varied. Family life inevitably involves balancing different needs, desires and 
concerns of family members and this is not always to the advantage of the family member 
who has mental health difficulties.6 Addressing the role of family in mental health law 
therefore requires finding ways to deal with this complexity.  
 
This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the role of family in mental 
health law in two ways.  First, it places the current treatment of family in mental health 
legislation within a temporal and narrative context, thus contributing to a better 
understanding of the origins of current legal approaches.  Secondly, it develops a normative 
context for ongoing debates regarding the appropriate treatment of family.  The article 
focuses on mental health legislation in two jurisdictions, England and Wales, and Ireland, 
which provide an interesting contrast in approach. In England and Wales, the current 
treatment of family in the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA 1983) is centred on the figure of 
the ‘nearest relative’.  This focus derives from the 1957 report of the Percy Commission,7 
which sought to address the legal implications of the nascent move from institutional to 
community-based care.   In Ireland, for reasons discussed below, the Mental Health Act 
2001 (MHA 2001) adopts a classic individualist legal framework, with family being largely 
absent from the legislative framework.  In both jurisdictions, mental health legislation 
applies only to people who have been formally made subject to compulsion.  In England 
and Wales, this is initiated either by ‘formal’ admission to a psychiatric hospital or by being 
made subject to a Supervised Community Treatment (SCT) order  while, in Ireland, 
compulsion requires ‘involuntary’ admission to an ‘approved facility’.8  
 
                                                 
6 On the complexity of family relationships and the potential for abuse, see evidence given to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Inquiry on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (uncorrected 
transcript, Tuesday 25 June 2013)  
7 Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency Cmnd 169 (London: 
MHSO, 1957). 
8 In England, in 2011/12, there were 48, 631 detentions under the MHA 1983 and 4,220 uses of SCT orders: NHS 
Information Centre Inpatients formally detained in hospitals under the Mental Health Act 1983 and patients subject 
to supervised community treatment orders, Annual Figures, England, 2011-12 (NHS, 2012). In Ireland, 
approximately 10% of first admissions to an approved centre are involuntary (2,057 admissions): see A Daly and D 
Walsh HRB Statistics Series 18: Activities of Irish Psychiatric Units and Hospitals 2011 (Dublin: HRB, 2012), p 15 
and Mental Health Commission Annual Report 2011 (Dublin: MHC, 2012), p 29.   
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The article chooses to focus on the concept of ‘family’ rather than that of ‘carer’ (although, 
of course, family members will frequently fulfill the role of carers).9  This is in part because 
of the particular narrative status accorded to the ‘myth’ of the family in the discourse of 
mental illness and in the shaping of societal and legal responses to mental illness10 and also 
because we want to address the range of relationships within families which would not 
necessarily be categorized as involving a carer.11 In the description of narratives in the first 
part of the article, we are working with the traditional form-based definition of ‘family’ as 
social unit based around marriage and blood ties.12  However, in the normative discussion 
undertaken in Part II, we utilise a more inclusive definition of family, grounded in a 
functional approach. Thus, in this part of the article we recognise that a relationship can be 
a ‘family’ relationship even in the absence of ties of blood or marriage if it is characterized 
by ‘emotional and economic interdependence, mutual care and concern and the 
expectation of some duration’.13 
 
‘Family’ in Mental Health Legislation  
In order to understand the choices that have been made about the role of family in mental 
health legislation, it is instructive to consider first the different narratives of family in the 
discourse of mental illness.14 By identifying these narratives, our goal is to look beyond the 
                                                 
9 Several authors have addressed the role of carers in mental health law: see in particular, K Keywood ‘Gatekeepers, 
Proxies, Advocates?: The Evolving Role of Carers under Mental Health and Mental Incapacity Law Reforms’ 
(2003) 25 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 355; V Yeates, ‘Ambivalence, Contradiction and Symbiosis: 
Carers’ and Mental Health Users’ Rights’ (2007) 29 Law & Policy 435, 438-39.  For a broader evaluation of the 
position of carers within the law, see J Herring, Caring and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2013). 
10 See D. Jones, Myths, Madness and the Family: The Impact of Mental Illness on Families (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2002), p 12. 
11 The meaning of the term ‘carer’ is itself open to debate: see J. Herring ‘Carers’ in L Gostin et al eds, Principles of 
Mental Health Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p 348-49.  In formal policy documents, the most widely used meaning of 
the term is a person providing care and support to a relative or friend because of age and/or disability and excluding 
parents of minor children and paid carers: see J Herring, ‘Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?’ 
(2007) 27 Legal Studies 51, 52. 
12 See L Glennon, ‘Obligations between Adult Partners: Moving from Form to Function’ (2008) 22 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 22, 23-24. 
13 In this we reflect the diversity of relationships in contemporary society: see Law Commission of Canada, Beyond 
Conjugality: Recognising and Supporting Close Adult Personal Relationships (Ottawa: Law Commission of 
Canada, 2001), p 114. 
14 On the various roles played by narratives and story-telling within the law, litigation and legal scholarship, see J 
Baron, ‘The Many Promises of Storytelling in Law’ (1991) 23 Rutgers Law Journal 79; J Baron, ‘Intention, 
Interpretation and Stories’ (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal 630; D Farber and S Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: 
An Essay on Legal Narratives (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 807. 
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overt or express policy underpinnings for the legislation (although we also acknowledge 
these) and to consider also the pervasive beliefs and unstated influences which underpin 
the legal provisions.15 Although within real families relationships are complex and are 
rarely, if ever, reducible to any single narrative, separating out different narratives is 
helpful because the competing narratives reflect inevitable tensions which mental health 
law must confront. Narratives are especially interesting in this context because, as David 
Jones argues, in the mental health context, ‘myths about the power of families to do great 
harm - or to heal and make all things well – sweep through policy assumptions, the models 
used by professionals and academics and through the lives of ordinary people.’16  
Narratives are also important for the discussion in this article because, as described by 
Robert Cover, narrative provides not just the context for law but also its ‘nomos’ or 
‘normative universe’. Thus, ‘every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive 
point, its moral.’17 Recognising the underlying narratives, therefore, is valuable in 
attempting to establish a normative context for the role of families in mental health law. 
 
Narratives of ‘Family’ in the Discourse of Mental Illness 
Three different narratives of family are explored here. In the first narrative, families are 
presented as a cause of mental illness and/or as contributors to an inappropriate medical 
and societal response to the illness.  Thus, within this narrative, family is regarded as a 
threat to the mentally ill individual.  In the second narrative, families are portrayed as 
victims, suffering emotional distress and placed at physical and emotional risk because of 
one member’s mental illness. Within this narrative, the mentally ill individual can 
sometimes be seen as a threat to the family.  A third narrative sees families as protectors, 
providing support and facilitating recovery and/or survival.  Although these narratives 
resonate differently in contemporary social contexts, understanding the origins of the 
narratives is important both because it provides insights into the unspoken policy drivers 
of the legislative frameworks explored in this article and also because these narratives 
                                                 
15Although there is no ‘bright line’ dividing narratives from other policy material, narratives may be characterized 
by their ‘development, pervasiveness and the confidence with which they are asserted’: J Benjamin, ‘The Narratives 
of Financial Law’ (2010) 20 OJLS, 787, 788.  
16 D. Jones, Myths, Madness and the Family: The Impact of Mental Illness on Families (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2002), p 5, original emphasis. 
17 R Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4, 5. 
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expose, albeit at times in a caricatured way, some of the tensions that still have to be dealt 
with in modern mental health law.  
 
Two formulations of the narrative of family as threat may be identified.  In the first, the 
narrative is that of family as a cause of, or contributor to, mental illness.  This narrative has 
long been prevalent within the discourse of mental illness. Within nineteenth/early 
twentieth century eugenicist discourse, families were seen as providing a direct genetic 
cause of mental illness.18 The concern that ‘degenerate’ parents (a category which included 
people who were mentally ill as well as people who were intellectually disabled and those 
who had criminal tendencies) would pass on these genes to their children provided the 
basis for widespread sterilization programmes in several jurisdictions.19 With the growth 
of psychoanalysis and the Freudian focus on early childhood experience, parents again 
assumed a pivotal role in the attribution of causes of certain forms of mental illness.20 The 
1950s and 1960s saw the growth of the family therapy movement and a focus on the 
dysfunctional (or ‘skewed’) family as a cause of schizophrenia.21 At around this time also, 
and alongside the growth in the feminist movement, family dynamics, and in particular the 
gendered roles within families, was identified as a cause of mental illness in women.22 
 
                                                 
18 See in particular, Benedit-Augustin Morel’s work on ‘degeneration’: see T Millon, Masters of the Mind: 
Exploring the Story of Mental Illness from Ancient Times to the New Millennium (New Jersey: John Wiley & Co, 
2004) and R Huertas, ‘Madness and Degeneration, I: From “Fallen Angel” to Mentally Ill’ (1992) 3 History of 
Psychiatry 391. 
19 See RL Burgdorf and MP Burgdorf, ‘The Wicked Witch is almost Dead: Buck v Bell and the Sterilization of 
Handicapped Persons’ (1977) 50 Temple Law Quarterly 995, 997-99.   
20 See in particular the work of Frieda Fromm-Reichman who postulated that male schizophrenia developed in the 
context of the combination of the ‘schizophrenogenic mother’,  whose personality and mothering style was cold, 
domineering and guilt-inducing, and an ineffectual father : ‘Notes on Development of Treatment of Schizophrenics 
by Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy’ (1948) 11  Psychiatry 263. 
21 See the work of Theodore Lidz on schizophrenogenic parents and the’ skewed’ family environment (one which is 
seemingly harmonious but where one spouse passively accedes to the strange concepts of the other spouse regarding 
child rearing and family dynamics) : see R Lidz and T Lidz,‘The Family Environment of the Schizophrenic Patient’ 
(1949) 106 American Journal of Psychiatry332; T Lidz, A Cornelison and S Fleck Schizophrenia and the Family 
(International Universities Press, 1965).  See also the work of Murray Bowen, ‘A Family Concept of Schizophrenia’ 
in D Jackson ed, The Aetiology of Schizophrenia (Oxford: Basic Books, 1960). 
22 See Broverman et al, “Sex-role stereotype and Clinical Judgements of Mental Health” (1970) 34 Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology 1; P Chesler, Women and Madness (New York: Doubleday, 1972).  See also 
Charlotte Gilman’s short story depicting female’s mental illness, ‘The Yellow Wallpaper’ (1892), which is 
interpreted by some feminist commentators as an early evocation of the way in which gendered roles within family 
and society can drive some women to madness. 
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A second formulation of the narrative of family as threat sees family less as a direct cause of 
mental illness but instead presents family as a contributing factor in the inappropriate 
labeling of certain people as mentally disordered.  Leading figures in the anti-psychiatry 
movement, RD Laing and Aaron Esterson, drew on their study of eleven women who had 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia to argue that the behaviour displayed by these women 
was, in fact, a rational response to an impossible family situation.23 Feminist theorists have 
also identified the role of family in the inappropriate labelling of women as mentally 
disordered and in the inappropriate detention of women in psychiatric facilities.24 It was 
argued that women who deviated from societal expectations regarding their role within the 
family were more likely to regarded as mentally ill and to be detained (often at the behest 
of husbands or fathers).25 
 
A second narrative is that of family as victim, suffering alongside (and at times because of) 
the family member with a mental illness. Literary representation of this narrative may be 
seen in the unsympathetic portrayal of Mr Rochester’s ‘mad’ wife, Bertha Mason, in 
Charlotte Brönte’s Jane Eyre.26 The narrative of family as victim is also seen by some 
historians as a contributor to the widespread growth of asylums in the nineteenth century.  
Medical historian, David Rothman, argues that, while initially reluctant to commit family 
members to asylums, ‘once the family’s tolerance was exhausted, they gave their burden 
over to the asylum, grateful for the relief it provided’.27 Rothman argues that the idealized 
view of the family also provided the model for nineteenth century asylums which sought, at 
least in theory, to mimic the order and discipline found in the ideal family.  
 
                                                 
23 Sanity, Madness and the Family (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970). 
24 See P Chesler Women and Madness (New York: Doubleday, 1972); E Showalter, The Female Malady, Women, 
Madness and English Culture 1830-1980 (London: Virago Press, 1985); J Ussher, Women’s Madness - Misogyny or 
Mental Illness? (London: Wheatsheaf Harvester, 1991). 
25 See F Boland and J Laing, ‘Out of Sight and Out of Mind? A Feminist Perspective on Civil Commitment in 
Britain and Ireland [1999/2000] Contemporary Issues in Law 257, 261. 
26 Bertha Mason (the first Mrs Rochester) is portrayed as violent and insane (although the nature of her illness is not 
clear) and a cause of distress and danger both to her husband and to the heroine.    
27 D Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic (Toronto: Little, 
Brown.1971) (rev’d Ed,1990), p xlvi. 
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The move towards de-institutionalisation led the narrative of families as victim to assume a 
different tenor. Families were increasingly required to take the place of the asylum and the 
respite which the asylum offered was no longer available. ‘Burden research’, which came to 
prominence at around this time, seeks to investigate the impact of one family member’s 
mental illness on the family as whole.  Here, the focus is less on the view of family as a 
victim of the family member with a mental illness; instead, the concern is to investigate the 
‘presence of problems, difficulties or adverse events which affect the life (lives) of the 
psychiatric patient’s significant others (e.g. members of the household and/or the 
family)’.28 Researchers have developed different burden scales which provide mechanisms 
for the measurement of burdens on families.29 While there are variations at a level of 
detail,30 the extensive empirical data which has been collected indicates that, in many 
instances, family members of people with mental illness experience burdens and pressures 
which vary in extent and, in some cases, are very significant.31 There is also evidence that 
families can experience a substantial degree of stigmatization because of one member’s 
mental illness.32 
 
A third narrative is that of families as supporter and protector of the interests of the family 
member with a mental illness.  This narrative may encompass family members acting as 
carer/s or being involved to some degree in the provision of care.33   The relationship 
narrative of the family member and the person with a mental illness can often be a complex 
                                                 
28 S Platt, ‘Measuring the Burden of Psychiatric Illness on Family: An Evaluation of Some Rating Scales’ (1985) 15 
Psychological Medicine 383, 383.  
29 See J Grad and P Sainsbury, ‘Mental Illness and the Family’ [1963] The Lancet 544. 
30 Some scales differentiate between objective burdens which are verifiable and observable, such as financial 
burdens, disruption of family life and social isolation, and subjective burdens, which relate to the emotional impact 
and distress which family members feel: see J Hoenig and MW Hamilton, ‘The Schizophrenic Patient in the 
Community and His Effect on the Household’ (1966) 12 International Journal of Social Psychiatry 165. 
31 See G Faden et al ‘The Burden of Care: The Impact of Functional Psychiatric Illness on the Patient’s Family’ 
(1989) 150 British Journal of Psychiatry 285; E Kuipers ‘Needs of Carers’ in G Thornicroft ed, Measuring Mental 
Health Needs (RC Psych Publication 2001); N Sartorius et al,. Families and Mental Disorder: From Burden to 
Empowerment (Chicester: John Wiley & Sons, 2005). 
32 P Corrigan and F Miller, ‘Shame, Blame and Contamination: A Review of the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on 
Family Members’ (2004) 13 Journal of Mental Health 537. 
33 The question of what constitutes ‘care’ is open to debate, in particular the question of whether care can be defined 
on the basis of a relationship alone or whether action is required: see Jonathan Herring’s argument that there is no 
bright line test but that certain markers can provide the basis for an understanding of care: Herring, Caring and the 
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2013), p 14.  The markers of care suggested by Herring are: meeting needs; respect; 
responsibility and relationality, pp 14- 25. 
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one. It is frequently marked by bonds of love and affection but also at times by duty, shame 
and resentment.34 Additionally, as Janet Henderson describes, the dyad is not always 
simple; Henderson notes that ‘instead, the identity of “cared for” and “carer” may be 
shared, with partners experiencing both identities at the same time’.35  Henderson also 
points out that both parties in a relationship ‘may not always, or indeed ever, agree about 
the nature of care or the need for it.’36  The care relationship may also have a temporal and 
intermittent quality.  As Henderson describes, ‘[o]ne of the challenges to both people in the 
relationship is the watching or waiting’.37 She notes that this a key difference between care 
relationships in the context of mental illnesses such as manic depression and in the context 
of physical illnesses. While the latter illnesses are generally either short-term or constant, 
the former may involve periods of distress separated by months or even years. For people 
in this kind of relationship, ‘the emotional component of the experience of care can be 
intense’.38  Yet, as Henderson notes, most participants in this kind of relationship would not 
classify this emotional engagement as emotional labour and nor would they describe what 
they are doing as care.39 
 
As will be seen in the discussion below, the impact of some of these narratives may be 
identified in the legislation.  In very general terms, Irish mental legislation predominantly 
reflects the first narrative, with family being seen as a threat to the individual while the 
legislation in England and Wales fits more closely with the second and third narratives.   
 
The Individualist Model: The Role of Family in Irish Mental Health Law 
The MHA 2001 provides a good example of an individualist approach to mental health care. 
Family and carers play almost no role in this legislative framework, other than being 
afforded a particularly divisive role in respect of admission.  
                                                 
34 See Jones, Myths, Madness and the Family: The Impact of Mental Illness on Families (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2002). Similar kinds of complexities are also evident in narratives of carers more generally: see Herring, Caring and 
the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2013), pp 5-7. 
35 J Henderson, ‘He’s not my Carer – He’s my Husband: Personal and Policy Constructions of Care in Mental 
Health’ (2001) 15 Journal of Social Work Practice 149, 154. 
36 Ibid, 155. 
37 Ibid, 156. 
38 Ibid, 156. 
39 Ibid, 157. 
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Under the MHA 2001, a person (referred to as ‘the patient’) may be admitted to an 
‘approved centre’ on the basis that s/he suffers from a ‘mental disorder’.40  An application 
for admission may be made by a spouse or (same sex) civil partner;41  by a relative; by an 
authorised officer (generally, a social worker); a member of the Garda Síochána (Irish 
police force); and, finally, by any other person.42 A ‘relative’ is extremely broadly defined43 
and there is no statutory hierarchy of relatives, with all having an equal right to apply for 
admission. In addition, the final ‘catch all’ category means that essentially any person (with 
some limited exclusions44) may initiate an application.45  In practice, the majority of 
involuntary admissions in Ireland are initiated by the spouse or relative of the person 
admitted.46  There is a practical reason for this. There is a very limited number of 
authorised officers in Ireland and, therefore, this route to admission is effectively not 
available in most situations.  The reality for most patients and families therefore is that a 
family member must take the initial formal step towards involuntary admission, something 
which can be profoundly undermining of family relationships.47  
 
Although family members play a significant role in having a person admitted, once the 
admission has taken place, family members (and carers) have no role.48  There is no 
                                                 
40 For the criteria for admission, see MHA 2001, s 3: see D Whelan Mental Health Law and Practice (Dublin: 
Round Hall, 2009), pp 75-80.  
41 MHA 2001, s. 9 as amended by the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010, 
s. 98.  A ‘spouse’ is defined (MHA 2001: s 2) as including a man or a woman who is cohabiting with a person of the 
opposite sex for a continuous period of not less than 3 years. The category of ‘spouse’ does not include a spouse of a 
person who is living separately and apart from the person or in respect of whom an application or order has been 
made under the Domestic Violence Act 1996: MHA 2001, s 9(8). 
42 MHA 2001, s 9(1). Note that cohabitants for less than three years and same-sex cohabitants fall within the ‘any 
other person’ category.   
43 MHA 2001, s. 2(1) defines a ‘relative’ as a parent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, or child 
of the person or of the spouse of the person, including relatives of the whole blood, the half blood or by affinity. 
44 MHA, s 9(3); the excluded categories are primarily concerned with avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
45 However, when an application is made by ‘any other person’, the applicant must include a statement of the 
reasons why it is so made and of his or her connection with the person: MHA 2001, s 9(5).   
46 In 2011, 57% of admissions (839 admissions) were initiated by the spouse or relative; 24% (354 admissions) by a 
member of the Garda Síochána; 8% (116 admissions) by an authorized officer and 11% (162 admissions) by another 
person:  Mental Health Commission Annual Report 2011 (Dublin: MHC, 2012), p 30.  This represents a fall from a 
high of 69% of applications for admissions by a spouse or relative in 2007.  
47 See text to n 85 below. 
48 The only reference to family members beyond the application for admission comes in the context of ensuring that 
the medical professionals who determine admission (and carry out oversight functions in this regard) are not the 
spouse or relative of the person admitted: MHA 2001, ss 10 and s 24. 
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mechanism in the MHA 2001 to permit family members or carers to act on behalf of the 
patient.  Nor is there any provision requiring that family members or carers be consulted 
or given any information in respect of the patient, even where the patient consents to or 
indeed requests that this should happen. Reference to family and carers is omitted even 
where the patient lacks capacity. There is a requirement under s. 4(2) of the MHA 2001 
that patients should be provided with notification of proposed recommendations or 
treatment and that they must be entitled to make representations in relation to the 
proposals. However, there is no legislative requirement to notify family members or carers 
where the patient lacks capacity and family members/carers have no statutory entitlement 
to make representations on behalf of the patient.  As a result, the legislation effectively 
leaves patients lacking capacity without any provision for support structures, whether 
derived from their family or otherwise.  The absence of a role for family continues through 
to discharge. Family members have no statutory entitlement either to apply for discharge 
of the patient or to be informed in respect of the decision to discharge or of the discharge 
itself. At a sub-statutory level, the picture is somewhat different. The Code of Practice on 
Admission, Transfer and Discharge, developed by the Mental Health Commission, refers 
regularly to the importance of consultation with the resident (of the approved centre) and 
the resident’s “family/carer or chosen advocate, if appropriate (i.e. with the consent of the 
resident).”49 This is particularly emphasized in the context of discharge from an approved 
centre. However, the MHA 2001 does not impose a legal duty on those working within the 
mental health services to comply with the provisions of codes of practice and it is unclear 
to what extent this is adhered to in practice.  
 
The individualist approach to family under the MHA 2001 is evident even in respect of 
children who have been admitted under the legislation.50 The only mentions of parents in 
the MHA 2001 are to ensure that parents, or persons acting in loco parentis, are not 
                                                 
49 Mental Health Commission, Code of Practice on Admission, Transfer and Discharge to and from an Approved 
Centre, available at www.mhcirl.ie. See also the Mental Health Commission Rules Governing Seclusion and 
Mechanical Means of Bodily Restraint and the Rules and Code of Practice on Electro-Convulsive Therapy both of 
which include reference to discussions with next of kin/representative. 
50 The vast majority of admissions of children (statutorily defined in the MHA 2001, s 2 as persons under the age of 
18 years) are ‘voluntary’ admissions where consent to admission is provided by the parents. 
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permitted to refuse consent for a child to be examined51 and to prevent parents from 
removing a child who has been admitted as a voluntary patient if staff at the approved 
centre consider that the child has a mental disorder.52 Parents are afforded no statutory 
consultative role in respect of the kinds of treatment provided to their children.53  
 
The limited role accorded to family in the MHA 2001 may be explained in part by the social 
context within which the Act was introduced.  Ireland has a history of very high levels of 
admission to/incarceration in psychiatric institutions where patients were held in, at times, 
appalling conditions.54  The MHA 2001 (which did not come into operation until 2006) 
replaced the Mental Treatment Act 1945, which had afforded family an extraordinary 
degree of latitude in respect of admission and ongoing detention of patients with extremely 
limited scope for review.55 Several high profile cases before the courts had shown 
inappropriate use of detention initiated by spouses in the context of marital difficulties.56  
These cases also made evident that the Mental Treatment Act 1945 (where a valid 
admission could be made solely on the basis of a certificate by a general practitioner) had 
been ineffective in preventing this.57  There was also evidence from studies conducted 
under the 1945 Act regime that some family members had used certification and admission 
to psychiatric hospitals as a response to difficult or challenging behaviour by the person 
admitted58 or to lack of compliance with traditional marital roles59 and that this use of 
                                                 
51 MHA 2001, s. 25(3). 
52 MHA 2001, s. 23(2). 
53 This is surprising given the elevated status of parental rights under the Constitution of Ireland at the time of the 
MHA 2001: see M Donnelly, ‘Treatment for a Mental Disorder: The Mental Health Act 2001, Consent and the Role 
of Rights’ (2005) 40 Irish Jurist 220, 257. 
54 See P Prior ed, Asylums, Mental Health Care and the Irish: Historical Studies 1800-2010 (Dublin/Portland, 
Oregon: Irish Academic Press, 2012).  For a literary representation, see S Barry, The Secret Scripture (London: 
Faber, 2008).   
55 See AM O Neill, Irish Mental Health Law (Dublin: FirstLaw, 2005), pp 113-14. 
56 See O’Reilly v Moroney [1992] 2 IR 145 (High Court); unreported Supreme Court 16th November 1993, where a 
woman who was experiencing marital difficulties had, at the instigation of her husband and father, been admitted on 
the basis of a certificate by a General Practitioner who had not spoken to her and had merely observed her reaction 
to her husband’s arrival from a position in the front garden; Bailey v Gallagher [1996] 2 ILRM 433 where the 
appellant was admitted by his wife in the midst of considerable marital and business difficulties and was detained 
notwithstanding the absence of any evidence of mental disorder.  
57 See F Boland, ‘Compulsory Detention and the General Practitioner in Irish Mental Health Law: Armour or 
Weapon in Wrongful Committals?’ (2001) 52 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 205. 
58 See T Carey and J Owens, ‘Involuntary Admissions to a new District Mental Health Service- Implications for a 
new Mental Treatment Act’ (1993) 10 Ir J Psychol Med 139. 
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certification had been supported by general practitioners.60 As described by one politician 
in the debates preceding the introduction of the MHA 2001, ‘[w]e all remember families 
dumping people in institutions in previous decades’.61  Thus, a strong feature of the context 
for the introduction of the MHA 2001 was a perceived need to address the lack of 
protection for people with mental illness from the threat posed by their families.   
 
Given this context, it seems odd that, while family are effectively written out of the 
legislation once a person has been admitted, they (and any other persons) retain extensive 
powers at admission stage. There is no indication in the Dáil (parliamentary) debates on 
the MHA 2001 that this matter was considered and no reason is offered as to why it was 
considered appropriate to allow such a wide range of people the power to initiate the 
involuntary admission process.  Clearly, however, this constituted a low-cost alternative to 
the introduction of a comprehensive system of authorised officers and it is likely the 
tribunal review system, which the MHA 2001 introduced into Irish law for the first time,62 
was considered sufficient to avoid any difficulties in terms of inappropriate admission.   
 
Two further reasons can be identified for the the omission of reference to family (and 
carers) in the MHA 2001. First, the Act is entirely focused on institutional or hospital-based 
care.  Although the provision of community-based care became a cornerstone of Irish 
mental health policy with the publication of the policy paper, A Vision for Change63 in 2006, 
the MHA 2001 pre-dated this policy development.  Accordingly, the Act does not make any 
attempt to address issues which arise where mental health care is delivered in a 
community, rather than an institutional, context.64  Thus, the legislative position is clearly 
distinct from the policy position advocated in A Vision for Change which recognises ‘the 
                                                                                                                                                             
59 See F Boland and J Laing, ‘Out of Sight and Out of Mind? A Feminist Perspective on Civil Commitment in 
Britain and Ireland [1999/2000] Contemporary Issues in Law 257. 
60 See T Carey and J Owens, ‘Involuntary Admissions to a new District Mental Health Service- Implications for a 
new Mental Treatment Act’ (1993) 10 Ir J Psychol Med 139. 
61 Dáil Debates, Mental Health Bill 1999, Second Stage, Thursday 6 April 2000, Vol 517 Col 1021. 
62 On the review system introduced in MHA 2001, see D Whelan, Mental Health Law and Practice (Dublin: Round 
Hall, 2009), pp 211-256. 
63
 A Vision for Change: Report of the Expert Group on Mental Health Policy (Dublin: Stationary Office, 2006). 
64 The process of de-institutionalisation has also proceeded more slowly in Ireland than in other developed 
jurisdictions. In 2006, 32.3% of patients in Irish ‘approved centres’ had been resident there for more than five years: 
Mental Health Commission, Annual Report 2006 (Dublin: MHC, 2007). 
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need to formally recognise and support through practical means the crucial role of family 
care in mental health service provision.’65  
Secondly, a striking feature of the MHA 2001 is the scope of the role of the ‘consultant 
psychiatrist’ who is responsible for the care and treatment of the patient.  Under the MHA 
2001, the consultant psychiatrist is established as effectively the sole decision-maker in 
respect of involuntary patients.  There is no legislative provision for consultation with 
other professionals involved in the care and treatment of the patient.66  The lack of a role 
for family might therefore also be seen as part of a heavily medicalised/clinician-centred 
model of care and treatment with little room for any perspectives other than those of the 
consultant psychiatrist.67   
 
A Restricted Role for Family: The ‘Nearest Relative’ under the MHA 1983 
As mentioned previously, the legal treatment of family in the MHA 1983 derives from the 
recommendations of the Percy Commission in 1957.68 The Commission had sought to 
address the emerging shift from institutional to community care which began in England 
and Wales in the years after World War II.  In this context, the Percy Commission 
recognised that relatives had a vital role to play and, while it accepted that some relatives 
might take advantage of family members with mental disorders, it considered that such 
occurrences would be rare.69 Although parliamentarians were somewhat less sanguine,70 
the Mental Health Act 1959 largely reflected this narrative of family. With relatively limited 
                                                 
65 A Vision for Change: Report of the Expert Group on Mental Health Policy (Dublin: Stationary Office, 2006), p 
28.   
66 Contrast the position under MHA 1983 as amended by the Mental Health 2007 where the ‘responsible clinician’ 
for the patient’s care and treatment is an ‘approved clinician’ and may be drawn from a number of healthcare 
professions.  Additionally, the oversight mechanism under the MHA 1983 imposes a requirement on the second 
opinion clinician to consult with at least two other professionals involved in the patient’s care: MHA 1983, s 58(4). 
67
 On the inferior role afforded to ‘lay’ knowledge within the mental health system (in England and Wales), see K 
Keywood ‘Nearest Relatives and Independent Mental Health Advocates: Advocating for Mental Health?’ in L 
Gostin et al, Principles of Mental Health Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), pp 330-31.  
68 Report of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency Cmnd 169 
(London: MHSO, 1957). 
69 D Hewitt, The Nearest Relative Handbook (2nd Ed) (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2009), p 15. 
70 Ibid. 
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changes introduced by the MHA 1983 and the Mental Health Act 2007, the model proposed 
by the Percy Commission continues in place to the present day.71  
 
The scheme for including family under the MHA 1983 is centred on the figure of the 
‘nearest relative’ of the ‘patient’ (who has been formally admitted or is subject to an SCT 
order).  The nearest relative is determined in accordance with a statutory hierarchy 
beginning with husband, wife, civil partner (and in certain circumstances, co-habitant72); 
son or daughter; father or mother; brother or sister; grandparent; grandchild; uncle or 
aunt; nephew or niece.73 A relative is precluded from being categorised as the ‘nearest 
relative’ where s/he is not resident in the United Kingdom, Channel Islands or the Isle of 
Man; where s/he is the patient’s spouse or civil partner and is permanently separated from, 
or has/has been deserted by, him or her; or where s/he is under the age of 18 years.74 A 
degree of special treatment is afforded to family members who are carers. If the person 
admitted ordinarily resides with or is cared for by one or more of his or her relatives, this 
relative will take priority over all other relatives, including a spouse or civil partner.75 In 
addition, a non-relative with whom the patient ordinarily resides for a period of not less 
than five years (or resided prior to admittance to hospital) is treated as if s/he were a 
relative.76  However, s/he comes last in the hierarchy in determining the nearest relative 
and may not be treated as the nearest relative of a married/civil partnered patient.77  Thus, 
the MHA 1983 is very clear in privileging blood ties over more broadly defined care 
relationships. 
 
                                                 
71 P Bartlett and R Sandland, Mental Health Law, Policy and Practice (3rd Ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), p 159. 
72 A husband, wife or civil partner is defined as including a person who is living with the patient as the patient’s 
husband, wife or civil partner for a period of not less than six months: MHA 1983, s 26(6) as amended by MHA 
2007, s 26.  However, a person may not be treated as the nearest relative of a married patient on this basis unless the 
patient is permanently separated from or has been/has deserted their husband, wife or civil partner: MHA, s 26(6). 
73 MHA 1983, s.26(1). 
74 MHA 1983, s 26(5). 
75 MHA 1983, s. 26(4).  
76 MHA 1983, s. 26(7). 
77 MHA 1983, s. 26(7). 
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A patient may apply to the County Court to have the person who is the nearest relative 
under the statutory hierarchy displaced from this role.78 Applications for displacement may 
also be made by any relative of the patient; by any other person with whom the patient is 
residing (or was residing prior to admission to hospital) or by an Approved Mental Health 
Professional (AMHP) (formerly an Approved Social Worker).79 An application to displace 
the nearest relative may be made on the basis that a nearest relative ‘unreasonably objects 
to the making of an application for admission for treatment or a guardianship application’ 
or where s/he has ‘exercised without due regard to the welfare of the patient or the 
interests of the public his power to discharge the patient … or is likely to do so’.80    Kirsty 
Keywood suggests that, in applications to displace brought by AMHPs, where there is a 
dispute between professional views and those of the nearest relative, the views of the 
professional almost inevitably dominate.81  
 
The nearest relative has a range of statutory functions which, as Keywood explains, can, 
broadly speaking, be divided into gatekeeper and support/advocacy functions.82  
Gatekeeper functions centre on admission and discharge.  The nearest relative may initiate 
an application for admission for assessment and treatment and for guardianship.83 
Although it was the intention of the Percy Commission that most applications for admission 
would be made by the nearest relative, in modern practice most applications are made by 
an AMHP.84  This approach has clear policy advantages. As recognised in the Mental Health 
Act 1983 Code of Practice, the AMHP is usually the most suitable applicant because of his or 
her professional training and knowledge of the legislation and local resources and also 
because of the potential adverse effect which an application by the nearest relative might 
                                                 
78 MHA 1983, s. 29(2)(a) inserted by MHA 2007, s. 23(4)(a).  This inclusion followed the judicial finding that the 
absence of a statutory right to make an application for removal of a person as nearest relative was incompatible with 
Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: see R(M) v  Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWHC 1094; 
note also the friendly settlement reached in JT v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR CD 77. 
79 MHA 1983, s 29(2).  
80 MHA 1983, s. 29(3). 
81 K Keywood ‘Nearest Relatives and Independent Mental Health Advocates: Advocating for Mental Health?’ in L 
Gostin et al, Principles of Mental Health Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p 331-32. 
82 K Keywood ‘Gatekeepers, Proxies, Advocates?: The Evolving Role of Carers under Mental Health and Mental 
Incapacity Law Reforms’ (2003) 25 Journal of  Social Welfare and Family Law 355. 
83 MHA 1983, s. 11(1).   
84 Bartlett and Sandland, Mental Health Law, Policy and Practice (3rd Ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
p 159. 
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have on that person’s relationship with the patient.85 As described earlier, the Irish position 
which requires family members to make applications for admission is profoundly 
undermining of family relationships (and the patient’s prospects of recovery). 
 
The nearest relative is also central where the application for admission has been initiated 
by an AMHP. An AMHP must not make an application for admission unless s/he has first 
consulted the person (if any) appearing to be the patient’s nearest relative (unless it 
appears to the AMHP that consultation is not reasonably practicable or would involve 
unreasonable delay).86 An AMHP is also precluded from making an application where the 
nearest relative has notified the AMHP or the local authority that s/he objects to the 
application being made.87 Several cases have reinforced the significant role played by these 
requirements in protecting patients’ right to liberty.88  It is clear both from the Mental 
Health Act 1983 Code of Practice89 and from relevant case law90 that the obligation to 
consult requires more than simply informing the nearest relative of the AMHP’s intention.  
The Code states that, in consulting nearest relatives, AMHPs should, where possible, 
ascertain the nearest relative’s views about the patient’s needs and the nearest relative’s 
own needs in relation to the patient; inform the nearest relative of the reasons for 
considering an application for detention and what the effects of such an application would 
be and inform the nearest relative of his or her role and rights under the legislation.91 
There is evidence that the nearest relative’s need for respite can play a significant role in 
                                                 
85 Rev’d ed (2008), para 4.28.   
86 MHA 1983, s. 11(4)(b). 
87 MHA, s 11(4)(a). In order to facilitate the nearest relative’s role in this regard, there is a statutory obligation on 
the AMHP to ‘take such steps as are practicable to inform’ the person (if any) appearing to be the nearest relative in 
respect of admission for assessment ‘before or within a reasonable time’ after an application for admission: 
MHA1983, s. 11(3). 
88 See TMM v London Borough of Hackney [2011] EWCA Civ 4 where the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s 
habeas corpus application on the basis the AMHP had failed to meet the statutory requirements; see also CX v A 
Local Authority [2011] EWHC 1918 (Admin); GD v Hospital Managers of the Edgeware Community Hospitals 
[2008] EWHC 3572 (Admin). 
89 Rev’d ed (2008). 
90 See R v South Western Hospital Managers, ex parte M [1994] 1 All ER 162; Re Briscoe [1998] EWHC 771 
(Admin);  GD v Hospital Managers of the Edgeware Community Hospitals [2008] EWHC 3572 (Admin);  
CX v A Local Authority [2011] EWHC 1918 (Admin). 
91 Rev’d ed (2008), para 4.64. 
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the AMHP’s decision to apply for admission.92 There is also evidence that the nearest 
relative’s objection to admission can lead the AMHP to try to negotiate an alternative to 
admission.93  Thus, in both a legal and a practical sense, the nearest relative acts as an 
important gatekeeper around admission, both in allowing/enabling admission and in 
stopping admission from happening. In the latter context, however, it should be recalled 
that the AMHP may apply for removal of a person as nearest relative thus limiting the 
powers of the nearest relative in this regard. 
 
The nearest relative also plays a role at the discharge stage, although his or her actual 
powers in this respect are substantially restricted.  The nearest relative can discharge a 
patient from detention, guardianship and from an SCT order.94 However, s/he must give 72 
hours’ notice in writing to the hospital managers of the intention to discharge and if, within 
this time, the responsible clinician furnishes a report to the hospital managers (typically 
referred to as a ‘barring certificate’) certifying that, in his/her opinion, the patient if 
discharged would be likely to act in a manner dangerous to other persons or to him or 
herself, the discharge by the nearest relative has no effect.95  The nearest relative is then 
also restricted from making a discharge order for the next six months96 although s/he can 
make an application for a tribunal review of the patient’s detention during this period.97  
S/he is also at risk of having an application made to have him or her discharged from acting 
as nearest relative.98  The person appearing to be the nearest relative is also entitled to be 
informed, seven days in advance, if practicable, if the patient is to be discharged,99 although 
                                                 
92
 L Bowers, ‘Reasons for Admission and their Implications for the Nature of Acute Inpatients Psychiatric Nursing’ 
(2005) 12 Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 231. 
93 J Rapaport ‘A Matter of Principle: the Nearest Relative under the Mental Health Act 1983 and Proposals for 
Legislative Reform’ (2004) 26 J Social Welfare and Family Law 377, 389. 
94 MHA 1983, s 23(2) as amended by MHA 2007. 
95 MHA 1983, s 25(1). 
96 MHA 1983, s 25(1). 
97 MHA 1983, s. 66(1)(g) as substituted by the Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order 2008, SI 2008/2833 (which 
established the Health Education and Social Care Chamber of the First-Tier Tribunal to replace the Mental Health 
Tribunal).  
98 See text to n 80 above. 
99 MHA 1983, s.133(1). 
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the patient may object to this information being given and in this case, the obligation to 
inform does not apply.100  
 
The second role of the nearest relative is one of support.  The MHA 1983 contains several 
measures which enable the nearest relative to assume a support/advocacy role, although, 
as Keywood argues, the Act does not actually mandate the nearest relative to act in this 
way.101 In order to facilitate the support role, the hospital manager of the facility where the 
patient is admitted is required to provide the person appearing to be the patient’s nearest 
relative with a copy of the statutory information which must be given to the patient 
(provided that the patient does not object to this happening).102 The nearest relative must 
also be informed of the renewal of a patient’s detention; the extension of an SCT order and 
the patient’s transfer to another facility.103 The nearest relative may also request an 
Independent Mental Health Advocate (IMHA)104 to visit and interview the patient for the 
purpose of providing help to the patient ‘in accordance with the arrangements’105 and the 
IMHA is required to comply with any ‘reasonable’ request in this regard.106  There is limited 
empirical data on how effectively the support aspects of the nearest relative role operate in 
practice.  Joan Rapaport’s study (which was conducted between 1995 and 2002) suggests 
that, while there were some instances in which the nearest relative was able (together with 
social work professionals) to provide valuable support to the patient,107 the more common 
experience was a lack of knowledge among both service users and nearest relatives of the 
powers and role of the nearest relative.108 
                                                 
100 MHA 1983, s. 133(4). 
101 K Keywood ‘Nearest Relatives and Independent Mental Health Advocates: Advocating for Mental Health?’ in L 
Gostin et al, Principles of Mental Health Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p 327. 
102 MHA 1983, s. 132(4).  Note, however, that these rights do not apply to a restricted patient who enters 
compulsory mental health care through the criminal justice system: Keywood ibid, p. 338. 
103 Code of Practice Rev’d ed (2008), para 2.30. 
104 The Independent Mental Health Advocacy service was introduced by the Mental Health Act 2007 and applies to 
‘qualifying patients’ which include any patients detained under the MHA 1983 and any patient subject to a 
supervised community treatment order.   
105 This is defined as providing help in obtaining information about the various legal measures in the Act and about 
any rights that may be exercised by the patient under the Act and help (by way of representation or otherwise) in 
exercising those rights: MHA 1983, s. 130B(1) and (2). 
106 MHA 1983, s. 130B(5)(a). 
107 See J Rapaport, Reflections on a ‘Relative Affair’: The Nearest Relative under the Mental Health Act 1983 
(London: Social Care Workforce Unit, 2012), p 34. 
108 Ibid, p 31. 
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The Percy Commission was prescient in recognising that delivery of mental health services 
in the community requires family support.  However, the nearest relative model, which has, 
by and large, remained unchanged since 1957, can be criticised on a number of grounds. 
First, the existence of the statutory hierarchy to determine the nearest relative effectively 
denies the patient any kind of real choice as regards who should act in this regard. 
Although a patient may now apply to court to displace a person from acting as his or her 
nearest relative, s/he does not have the right to choose who should act in his or her place.  
Additionally, as Keywood notes, the right to apply to court is a ‘rather weak advocacy tool’ 
because it places the onus on the patient (who is already in a vulnerable and 
disempowered position) to take the steps necessary to activate the process.109  The 
possibility that the figure of the nearest relative would be replaced by a ‘nominated person’ 
(nominated by the patient and approved by the AMHP)110 was identified in the law reform 
process leading to the introduction of the MHA 2007.  However, significant flaws in the 
proposed model were identified111 and ultimately no significant changes were made to the 
existing position.   
 
Secondly, by focussing on formal family ties rather than relationships of care, the MHA 
1983 downgrades the significance of care relationships which are not blood relationships.  
As Jonathan Herring notes, ‘the preference for the blood relationship over the caring 
relationship is difficult to justify’ given that ‘a blood tie is no guarantee that the person has 
the best interests of the other at heart or knows them well.’112 Thirdly, the dual role of 
gatekeeper/supporter creates inevitable tensions in the relationship between patients and 
nearest relatives.  As Victoria Yeates describes, the ‘mix of nearest relative powers both to 
apply for, and to resist, compulsion creates considerable potential for ambivalence in 
                                                 
109 K Keywood ‘Nearest Relatives and Independent Mental Health Advocates: Advocating for Mental Health?’ in L 
Gostin et al, Principles of Mental Health Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p 328. Note additionally the 
difficulties with the relevant standard for removal, that the person ‘not a suitable person to act.’ 
110 For description of the proposed model, see J Rapaport, ‘A Matter of Principle: the Nearest Relative under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 and Proposals for Legislative Reform’ (2004) 26 J Social Welfare and Family Law 377, pp. 
383-84. 
111 See V Yeates, ‘The Death of the Nearest Relative? Carers’ and Families’ Rights to Challenge Compulsion under 
Current and Proposed Mental Health Legislation’ [2005] Journal of Mental Health Law 123, 133-135. 
112 J Herring, Caring and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2013), p 172. 
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relationships between family members and care recipients’. 113  Yeates argues that this 
ambivalence is increased in the context of compulsory community care where a new 
expectation is placed on family carers to monitor patients ‘and ensure compliance with 
medication regimes’.114 
 
Finally, and of particular relevance to the discussion in this article, the nearest relative 
model can be criticised for failing to address the ‘web of relationships’ within which most 
people, with and without mental illness, live their lives.  The nearest relative provides a 
neat focus for professional engagement with family and, as such, has the benefit of 
simplicity. Professionals only have to deal with one person and can avoid having to engage 
in potentially messy family disagreements. 
This has some benefits115 but it represents a very restrictive view of patients and their 
families and makes no attempt to address the range of relationships within and outside 
families. In contrast to the legislative approach, the Code of Practice to the Mental Health 
Act 1983 recognises a much broader conception of family and there are several references 
throughout the Code to the support role of family (and others). The Code notes that the 
involvement of friends, relatives and other supporters may have significant benefits for the 
care and treatment of the patient, including reassurance to the patient, knowledge of the 
patient and practical assistance in helping the patient communicate information and 
views.116  On this basis the Code states that a patient may nominate a relative, friend or 
other informal supporter (as well as the formal IMHA) and recommends that professionals 
should ‘normally’ agree to a patient’s request to involve relatives, friends and other 
informal supporters.117  However, the Code also states that it is not appropriate to involve 
another person as requested by the patient where this would result in delay that would not 
be in the patient’s best interests, where the involvement of the person is contrary to the 
                                                 
113 V Yeates, ‘Ambivalence, Contradiction and Symbiosis: Carers’ and Mental Health Users’ Rights’ (2007) 29 Law 
& Policy 435, 443. 
114 Ibid. 
115 One benefit (as described by J Rapaport and J Manthorpe, ‘Family Matters: Developments concerning the Role 
of the Nearest Relative and Social Worker under Mental Health Law in England and Wales’ (2008) 38 British 
Journal of Social Work 1115, 1125) is that the nearest relative’s powers ‘legitimized the nearest relative’s 
involvement in wider service processes, as co-workers’. 
116 Rev’d ed (2008), para 2.36. 
117 Ibid, para 2.37. 
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patient’s best interests or where the person has requested that s/he should not be 
involved.  Thus, while expanding the category of people who can play a supportive role, the 
Code falls short of allowing for family members (or other nominated supporters) to serve 
as full-scale advocates.118 Furthermore, because it lacks the force of legislation, questions 
arise regarding the extent to which the Code is delivered upon in practice.119  
 
 
Finding a Place for Family?: The Normative Context 
The preceding discussion shows that, in the two jurisdictions discussed, current legislative 
responses to the role of family emerged in particular social and temporal contexts. It is also 
clear that, in both jurisdictions, the treatment of family and carers by mental health 
legislation is outdated.  Of course, the fact that the legislation is outdated does not 
necessarily mean that practices on the ground are similarly outdated.  As noted in the 
previous section, the Code of Practice to the MHA 1983 is a good deal more inclusive than 
the legislation itself and, in many situations, it may well be the case that suitable 
accommodations are reached between patients, their families and mental health 
professionals. However, even if this is the case, the legislative framework remains 
important. This is both because of what it mandates in a practical sense and because it 
constitutes a concrete representation of underlying values.   
 
This final part of the article develops a normative context for engagement with family in 
mental health law.  We begin by identifying the important role played by the traditional 
individualist liberal rights of autonomy and liberty in the development of modern mental 
health law.  We then outline a number of reasons why this approach fails to meet 
contemporary needs (although we also acknowledge the ongoing importance of these 
norms in the context of mental health law).  We argue that an approach based on 
conceptions of relational autonomy and vulnerability offers more potential both in respect 
                                                 
118 Ibid, para 2.37. 
119 On the legal status of the Code, see R (on the application of Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 58, 
[21] where the House of Lords affirmed that the Code is ‘guidance and not instruction’.  However, the Court also 
affirmed that the Code was ‘much more than mere advice which an addressee is free to follow or not as it chooses.’ 
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of individuals and in respect of family.  We also argue that this approach is in line with 
emerging jurisprudence in respect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and with the requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD).120 
 
 
Mental Health Law and Liberal Norms 
Baroness Hale, writing extra-judicially, describes mental health law as an ongoing attempt 
to reconcile ‘three overlapping but often competing goals: protecting the public, obtaining 
access to the services people need, and safeguarding users' civil rights’.121  As Genevra 
Richardson has pointed out, the dominant policy in mental health legislation has been the 
reduction of risk to the public.122  Within this context, the traditional terrain for normative 
discussion of the law’s treatment of mental illness involved the inter-play between the 
individual’s rights of autonomy and liberty and the State’s powers to restrict these rights in 
the case of people with mental illnesses. Given the substantial levels of discrimination 
endured by people with mental illness,123 the contribution made to the development of 
mental health law by arguments based on traditional liberal rights cannot be 
underestimated.  When operating within a risk-based policy agenda, individual rights such 
as liberty and autonomy are contested in ways which are clearly unacceptable in other 
contexts.124  In both the jurisdictions discussed in this article, mental health legislation 
                                                 
120 United Nations General Assembly, 13 December 2006, A/RES/61/106, Annex I.  The CRPD entered into force 
on 2 May 2008 on receipt of its twentieth ratification.  As of May 2013, the CRPD has been signed by 155 states and 
ratified by 130.  The CRPD has been ratified by the United Kingdom but not by Ireland although there is a political 
commitment to ratify following the proposed enactment of capacity legislation which is likely to occur in 2014.   
121 B Hale, ‘Justice and Equality in Mental Health Law: The European Experience’ (2007) 30 International Journal 
of Law and Psychiatry 18, 19. 
122 G Richardson, ‘Balancing Autonomy and Risk: A Failure of Nerve in England and Wales?’ (2007) 30 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 71, 75-76. 
123 See T Campbell and C Heginbotham, Mental Illness: Prejudice, Discrimination and the Law (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1991); M Perlin, ‘”Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How 
Mental Disability Law Developed as it Did’ (1999) 10 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 3; M Perlin, ‘“Where 
the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, “Us” and “Them”’ (1998) 31 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 775. 
124 Justifications for this level of differential treatment are generally unpersuasive: see the summary of arguments in 
M Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp 242-46.  
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permit deprivations of liberty and the overriding of autonomous decisions on the basis of 
mental illness.   
 
Philosophically, the antecedents of the traditional liberal approach to rights derive from 
the classic Millian vision of the individual as autonomous, independent and self-directed.125 
The subject as construed within this debate is ‘antecedently individuated’ in the sense of 
‘standing always at a certain distance from the interests it has’.126 Thus, family (or others) 
do not feature.  Instead, within the divide between public and private spheres of activity 
which has ‘long informed dominant Western ways of knowing and being,’127  family is very 
clearly located in the private sphere.  Family is ‘a sanctuary of privacy into which one can 
retreat to avoid state regulation.’128 In this way, family is rendered invisible and outside of 
the ambit of State involvement.  
 
There are a number of reasons why this conception of the rights subject is inadequate 
within contemporary mental health law.  First, the very existence of the individuated 
subject can be disputed on metaphysical grounds.  Arguing from a broadly communitarian 
perspective, Michael Sandel recognises the significance of community, not merely as ‘an 
attribute but a constituent of identity,’129 while feminist theorists argue that conditions of 
dependency, which are inevitable in childhood, are key in the creation of one’s moral 
personality.130 Thus, subjects are inevitably ‘socially embedded’.131  Secondly, there are 
normative reasons why the traditional liberal rights subject is not an appropriate construct 
around which to build a moral theory.  As described by Daniel Callahan, this approach 
‘elevates isolation and separation as the necessary starting point of human 
                                                 
125 JS Mill, On Liberty (London, 1859) (from ed Grey On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991). 
126 M Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2nd Ed) (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p 62. 
127 S Boyd, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law and Public Policy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997), p8. 
128 F Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 
1497, 1504. 
129 M Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2nd Ed) (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p 150. 
130 A Baier, Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 
p 85. 
131 C Mackenzie and N Stoljar, ‘Autonomy Reconfigured’ in C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar eds Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p 4. 
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commitments’.132 It fails to recognise the moral responsibilities which an individual owes 
to others, the weight of which responsibilities is ‘conditioned by the individual’s personal 
circumstances’.133  Theorists arguing  from a feminist perspective also point out that 
somebody has to do the work of caring, that this person is often female,134 and that the 
liberal focus on the individuated subject obscures the work of care and fails to recognise 
the uneven distribution of the burden of care.135  
 
Thirdly, the focus on the individuated rights subject is simply less helpful and effective as a 
protective mechanism in the context of contemporary models for mental health service 
delivery.136 Within the contemporary environment, the fear of patients being locked up for 
long periods in psychiatric hospitals no longer resonates.137   Instead, for many patients 
and their families, the primary problem is negotiating the bureaucracy involved in 
accessing both community and hospital services and even in obtaining basic information 
about available services.138 The most pertinent risk for the patient may be the collapse of 
the family support network leading to social consequences such as homelessness, isolation 
and deteriorating mental and physical health.  
 
 
                                                 
132 ‘Autonomy: A Moral Good not a Moral Obsession’ (1984) 14 Hastings Center Report 40, 41. See also M Sandel, 
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imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments [is] to imagine a person wholly without character, without 
moral depth.’ 
133 M Brazier, ‘Do no Harm - Do Patients Have Responsibilities too?’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal  397, 402. 
134 While this assertion is borne out in both jurisdictions discussed in this article, the differential is not so stark as 
might perhaps be expected: the most recent statistics show that in Ireland, 62% of carers are women: Carers’ 
Association, Carers in Ireland: A Statistical and Geographical Overview (2009) available at 
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135 R West ‘Jurisprudence and Gender’ (1988) 55 University of Chicago Law Review 1. 
136 See J Petrilla ‘Rights-based Legalism and the Limits of Mental Health Law: The United States of America’s 
Experience’ in  B McSherry and P Weller eds, Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford: Hart 
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Journal of Law and Medicine 783. 
137 See T Carney, ‘Involuntary Mental Health Treatment Laws: The ‘Rights’ and Wrongs of Competing Models’ in 
McSherry and Weller eds, Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
138 This is borne out by evidence from families: see Faden et al ‘The Burden of Care: The Impact of Functional 
Psychiatric Illness on the Patient’s Family’ (1989) 150 British Journal of Psychiatry 285; L Hallam, ‘How 
Involuntary Commitment Impacts on the Burden of Care of the Family’ (2007) 16 International Journal of Mental 
Health Nursing 247. 
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Alternative Approaches 
There is increasing recognition of the need to take account of the socially embedded 
subject in developing law and policy. A number of ways of doing this have emerged from 
the literature.  One argument advanced is the development of an alternative normative 
framework centred on an ‘ethic of care’.139 As Jonathan Herring notes, there is ‘no complete 
agreement over what an ethic of care means’.140  Herring sets out a number of central 
principles which underpin this approach.141  In brief, these are, first, a recognition that care 
is part of being human and that it is something which should be valued; secondly, a view 
that emotions are ethically significant; thirdly, an acceptance that people are relational and 
that their interests are intermingled; fourthly, a recognition of the importance of 
responsibilities; and, finally, a rejection of abstract moral rules.  Aspects of the normative 
approach which we advocate below are consistent with some of these principles, in 
particular, the view that people are relational and that interests are intermingled.  
 
However, we would be concerned about the (further) elevation of a responsibility-based 
approach in the context of mental health law.  Responsibility to others is already used as a 
basis to justify compulsory detention and treatment under mental health legislation.  In its 
exploration of the policy basis for differential legal treatment of people with mental 
illnesses, the Expert Committee Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 identified a belief that 
‘the consequences of untreated mental disorder may impact more directly and significantly 
on carers and relatives than do the consequences of untreated physical disorder.’142  We 
would be concerned that any legal extension of a responsibility-based approach, especially 
when this kind of approach is not a part of healthcare law in other respects,143 would lead 
                                                 
139 Early work in this respect focussed primarily on the ethics of care as a gendered phenomenon: see C Gilligan, In 
a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Womens’ Development (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press: 
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142 Expert Committee Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 (London: Department of Health, HMSO, 1999), para 
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143 See M Donnelly Healthcare Decision-making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism 
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law, see Brazier ‘Do no Harm - Do Patients Have Responsibilities too?’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 397. 
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to further erosion of the rights of people with mental illness. Accordingly, we argue that a 
more promising response to the challenges in finding a place for family in mental health 
law is based around conceptions of relational autonomy and vulnerability.   
 
Like the ethic of care, the concept of relational autonomy is variously defined.144 John 
Christman  argues that the factor which makes ‘a conception of autonomy uniquely 
“relational” or “social” is that among its defining conditions are requirements concerning 
the interpersonal or social environment of the agent.’145  Viewed from an ethics of care 
perspective, however, the distinctive feature of relational autonomy is the continued 
relevance of the principle of autonomy.  However, autonomy is conceived differently to the 
liberal view.  As described by Jennifer Nedelsky, under a relational approach, autonomy is 
not equated with independence.  Instead, ‘[a]utonomy is made possible by constructive 
relationships’.146  Under this view, autonomy is not static, a quality which one has (or does 
not have) but rather, a ‘capacity whose realization is ever shifting’. 147  Nedelsky, who puts 
forward a detailed exposition of relational autonomy from a legal perspective, explains why 
relational autonomy is especially relevant in the context of the modern bureaucratic state.  
She argues that:  
 
The central problem in the modern administrative state is no longer the traditional 
liberal objective of protecting individual autonomy by keeping the state at bay.  The 
problem is how to protect and enhance the autonomy of those who are within the 
(many) spheres of state power.’148  
 
This reflects the contemporary context for the delivery of mental health services where, as 
described above, the primary challenge for people with mental illness (and their families) 
                                                 
144 One relevant distinction is between ‘procedural’  and ‘substantive’ accounts, with the former being especially 
concerned with building autonomy capacities and the latter designating decisions made in certain circumstances as 
non-autonomous: see C Mackenzie and N Stoljar eds, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, 
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Sex, Reproduction and Family (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), pp 56-58. 
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is often negotiating bureaucracies and accessing appropriate treatment and services to 
promote recovery and enhanced quality of life.149 
 
 Relational autonomy is also a useful conceptual tool in the context of the current 
discussion because, although it accepts that humans must be viewed in a relational way, it 
does not presume that all relationships are benign.150 Thus, Nedelsky argues, the ‘relational 
project’ must be seen as ‘intrinsically evaluative and aimed at transformation.’151  
Relational autonomy is therefore not about maintaining existing relationships regardless of 
their nature.  Nedelsky argues, ‘[p]art of the reason relational autonomy is so important is 
that it is part of what enables people to extricate themselves from bad relationships as well 
as to transform the structures that shaped those relationships’.152 Thus, in the mental 
health context, a relational approach to law requires that people with mental illness must 
be enabled to extricate themselves from bad family relationships while, at the same time, 
supporting family relationships which enhance autonomy.  This is something which the 
legislation in both of the jurisdictions discussed in this article fails to achieve.  In England 
and Wales, the nearest relative framework makes it too difficult for a person with a mental 
illness to extricate him or herself from a bad family relationship153 while legislation in both 
jurisdictions fails to support autonomy-enhancing relationships between people with 
mental illness and their families (and other significant people in their lives).  
 
While we argue that a focus on relational autonomy provides an important conceptual tool 
in approaching the challenges of dealing with family in mental health law, this approach 
has limits in this situation.  A focus on the development of autonomy-enhancing 
relationships does not address the range of difficulties which people with mental illness 
and their families must confront.  During periods of serious mental illness, for some people 
at least, achieving autonomy may be difficult, if not impossible.  If the law is to work 
effectively during these periods, other conceptual tools are needed.  In this context, a 
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conceptual framework which recognises the role of vulnerability may provide grounding 
for an appropriate legal framework. 
 
A number of theorists, perhaps most notably in a legal context Martha Fineman, have 
identified the potential of a framework centred on the conception of vulnerability in 
reconceptualising the traditional liberal subject.154 Fineman seeks to reclaim the term 
‘vulnerable’ from the traditional way it is used in discussions of public responsibility to 
describe ‘groups of fledgling or stigmatized subjects’ (children, the elderly, people with 
HIV-AIDs).155   Fineman recognizes that when vulnerability is conceived of as a condition 
experienced by a minority, it is possible to avoid engaging with the constant possibility of 
vulnerability and the need to allocate the resources required to address the consequences 
of this.  Fineman argues that we should recognize that vulnerability is inherent in the 
human condition and that every human is, in some way, vulnerable and susceptible to 
harm. Thus, vulnerability is ‘a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition 
that must be at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility’.156. Fineman 
argues that because we recognize that all subjects are, in one way or another, vulnerable, 
the concept of vulnerability is ‘freed from its limited and negative associations’.157  
 
While arguing that vulnerability should be recognised as a universal attribute, Fineman 
also recognizes that vulnerability is particular and is experienced uniquely by each person.  
Thus, ‘[b]ecause we are positioned differently within a web of economic and institutional 
relationships, our vulnerabilities range in magnitude and potential on an individual 
level.’158. 
 
                                                 
154 See M Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale Journal 
of Law and Feminism 1 (reproduced in M Fineman ed, Transcending the Boundaries of Law, Generations of 
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Fineman acknowledges that the State cannot eradicate vulnerability; however, she argues 
that ‘it can and does mediate, compensate and lessen vulnerability through programmes, 
institutions and structures.’159 At the core of Fineman’s argument is the contention that 
recognition of the vulnerable subject requires a greater emphasis on the State’s 
responsibility towards individuals and institutions, including family.160 Thus, in contrast to 
some visions of the ethic of care, this model looks beyond allocating responsibility to the 
individual (in this case, the person with a mental illness) towards his or her carers/family 
members and asks instead whether, and how, the responsibility of the State and its 
institutions towards this person and towards his or her family network is being met.  This 
kind of approach requires a reformulation of the traditional liberal response whereby care-
taking is relegated to the family and operates within the private rather than the public 
sphere and is of limited concern to discourses developed around the individuated subject. . 
This narrative sees the patient as “vulnerable” but the family, comprised of traditional 
liberal subjects, is not susceptible to vulnerability and so can withstand the burdens 
associated with care-taking.  
 
By relocating responsibility for care, the vulnerabilities approach rejects the dichotomy 
between public and private spheres.  As described by Nicola Lacey , this dichotomy ‘allows 
government to clean its hands of any responsibility for the state of the ‘private’ world and 
depoliticizes the disadvantages which inevitably spill over the alleged divide by affecting 
the position of the “privately” disadvantaged in the “public” world’.161Instead this approach 
recognises that the State is always a residual player in ‘private’ family arrangements.162 In 
this way, this approach situates family at the intersection of public and private domains. It 
acknowledges that the situation in respect of each member of a family has an impact on the 
family as an entity and that this impact is enhanced in the context of care relationships 
within the family. Fineman describes family members providing care in this situation as 
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being in a position of ‘derivative dependency’.  She argues that ‘derivative dependency is 
not inevitable but is socially assigned as the responsibility of the private family.’163  
 
In the context of mental illness, responsibility for care and support have long been placed 
in the hands of family.  It is only when the family can no longer cope with the demands 
placed on it that the State assumes responsibility for care. At this point, there is a shift from 
the private to the public sphere and the legislative frameworks discussed in this article 
come into play.  Under a vulnerabilities approach, this is far too late for State engagement.  
Instead, this approach obliges the State to be responsive to the need to develop greater 
resilience for people with mental illnesses and for their families. The approach changes the 
questions asked, shifting the focus away from individual sets of relationships with their 
inevitable flaws and complexities and looks instead at what can be done to create or 
enhance frameworks in which both individuals and families can contribute to mental 
health and recovery. From a legal perspective, this approach requires a sustained 
interrogation of how law should respond both to the needs of the individual and to the 
needs of the family unit within which he or she is situated.   
 
Although there is little indication of this approach in the legislation discussed here, the 
beginnings of such an approach are evident in the Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice.  
In the context of admission, this states that it is important to identify all individuals who 
provide regular and substantive care for patients and to ensure that health and social 
services assess these carers’ needs and ‘where possible’ that they provide services which 
meet these needs.164 As noted earlier, however, a difficulty with the Code is its limited 
enforceability.165  Additionally, a truly responsive framework would come into operation 
long before the need for compulsion became an issue and would, to the benefit of people 
with mental illnesses and of their families, work to avoid the need for the formal admission 
process to be engaged.   
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The conceptual approaches advocated here shift the focus for analysis away from the old 
narratives which see family as a threat to the individual or the individual as a threat to 
family.  Instead, the common needs of individuals and family are emphasised to, we would 
argue, the benefit of both.  
 
Both approaches advanced here require more support from the State than is currently 
delivered under mental health law.  Thus, the approaches fit more comfortably with 
conceptions of positive rights rather than with the traditional liberal rights to be free from 
the state interference.  The final section develops the argument that a degree of support for 
this vision of mental health law can be found in the emerging jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and that it is also supported by the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).   
 
Human Rights Support for Relationality and Vulnerability Approaches 
Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to respect for private and family life.  Article 8   has 
been important in enhancing protections for individual rights, including the right of 
autonomy166 and the right to physical and psychological integrity,167 and these aspects of 
Art. 8 have contributed to the development of a more rights-based mental health law. 
Article 8 has also been important in affording greater recognition to the role of family, both 
as a source of support and in its own right.  The ECtHR has recognised that the individual’s 
right of privacy includes the individual’s right to foster and develop relationships.168 The 
Court has also found that, in some circumstances, individuals have a right to family support 
and involvement in decisions about their care. Thus, in Glass v United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
found a breach of the right to physical integrity of a severely physically and mentally 
disabled 14 year-old boy by the implementation of medical decisions made about him 
without his mother’s knowledge.169 The ECtHR did not find that the mother’s views should 
                                                 
166 In Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, para 61, the ECtHR found that ‘the notion of personal autonomy 
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have determined the matter but rather, that she should have been consulted and that, given 
that objections had been raised by the mother, the authorisation of the court should have 
been obtained.170 
 
Glass concerned a minor and a close family relationship.  The ECtHR expressly noted that 
the mother acted as the child’s legal proxy and that, in this capacity, she had the authority 
to act on his behalf and to defend his interests.171 Also, in his separate opinion, Casadevall J 
referred specifically to ‘maternal instinct’.172  Therefore, it is not clear how far an 
individual’s Art. 8 based right to have his or her family consulted would extend.  However, a 
case can certainly be made that some degree of consultation could be required in other 
situations where a patient lacked capacity.  Thus, the case can be viewed as support for the 
essentially relational proposition that, in some cases at least, individuals have a right to 
have their families involved in decisions about their healthcare and there is no reason in 
principle why this should not include decisions about mental health care. 
 
The decision in Glass was reached on the basis of the patient’s right to have his family 
consulted and the ECtHR declined to offer a view on the argument, which had been put 
forward by the second applicant, that Article 8 gave rise to a parental right to be 
consulted.173 However, the view that family members who are carers have rights on their 
own behalf was recently accepted by the ECtHR in Dordević v Croatia.174 The applicants in 
this case were a son and his mother. The first applicant was a man with physical and 
learning disabilities who had been subjected to sustained harassment by pupils from a 
neighbouring school.175 As a result of stress brought on by this harassment, the first 
applicant (who was described as ‘a peaceful and benign person who could not and did not 
know how to defend himself from the abusers’176) became very distressed.177The second 
                                                 
170 Ibid, para 88. 
171 Ibid, para 70. 
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applicant was the first applicant’s mother and carer.  She had informed the police of the 
ongoing harassment of her son on several occasions and had also informed the 
Ombudswoman for Persons with Disabilities. The ECtHR found that, although some efforts 
had been made, there had been no serious attempt to address the situation; no monitoring 
was put in place, social services were not involved and no counselling had been provided to 
the first applicant.178 
 
The ECtHR found that the respondent state had breached the first applicant’s Art. 3 right to 
protection from inhuman and degrading treatment.179 The Court also found that there had 
been a breach of the second applicant’s Art 8 right to private and family life even though 
she had not been subjected to ‘any form of violence affecting her physical integrity’.180 The 
Court found that there was no doubt that the continued incidents of harassment of her son 
‘for whom she has been taking care’ had concerned her personally and had, ‘even in their 
milder forms, caused disruption to her daily life and her routines’ and that these had had an 
adverse effect on her private and family life.181 The ECtHR then went on to note that the 
‘moral integrity’ of an individual is covered by the concept of private life and that the 
concept of private life extends also to ‘the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves.’182  The Court found that, ‘[w]hile the essential object of Article 8 is to protect 
the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities,’ there may also be 
positive obligations ‘inherent in effective respect for private and family life’.183 In certain 
circumstances, the State has a positive duty to protect the ‘moral integrity of an individual 
from the acts of other persons’ and to ‘ensure respect for human dignity and the quality of 
life in certain respects.’184 In the case in question, the State’s failure to put in place 
adequate protections to prevent the abuse of the first applicant constituted a violation of 
the Art.8 rights of the second applicant.  
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and developed psoriasis: ibid, para 60. 
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The decision in Dordević is important both because of the ECtHR’s recognition of rights in a 
relational context and because of the Court’s preparedness to impose a positive duty on the 
State to extend rights protection in this context.  The ECtHR was clear, however, that 
positive duties would be recognised only in limited situations.  The Court acknowledged 
that ‘operational choices’ must be made in terms of priorities and resources and that the 
scope of the positive obligation in the case in question must ‘be interpreted in a way which 
does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.’185 Thus, the 
decision does not necessarily presage an ECHR-derived paradigm shift in the direction 
advocated in this article.  Nonetheless, the approach of the Court might be argued to 
constitute the beginnings of support for this way of approaching the role of family in 
mental health law.    
 
Support for the position advocated in this article may also be drawn from the CRPD.  The 
Convention is regarded by many commentators as constituting a paradigm shift in the legal 
response to disability (including mental illness or psychosocial disability).186 Two aspects 
of the CRPD are of relevance to the discussion here.  First, the CRPD recognises both 
positive and negative rights and places clear obligations on States Parties to take positive 
steps to protect rights (both civil and political and social and economic rights) of persons 
with disabilities.187 Article 19 expressly requires States Parties to recognise the equal right 
of all persons with disabilities to live independently and to be included in the community. 
Art. 19(b) includes a specific requirement that States ensure that persons with disabilities 
have access to a range of in-home, residential and other community support services 
needed to support living and inclusion in the community.  As described by the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Art. 19 ‘embodies a positive philosophy, which is 
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about enabling people to live their lives to their fullest, within society.’188 It is difficult to 
see how a State can deliver on this right without engaging with the role of family (as well as 
the other people) insofar as this makes it possible for people with mental illness to live in 
the community.  Thus, the CRPD mandates the kind of positive State engagement which we 
argued earlier is inherent in a vulnerabilities approach. 
 
Secondly, the CRPD recognises that persons with disabilities operate in a relational context. 
This is especially evident (and important) in the context of legal capacity.  Michael Bach and 
Lana Kerzner note that a ‘relational understanding of autonomy is particularly important 
for those who require the support and assistance of others in communication, 
understanding and representing themselves to others; the case for many people with 
intellectual, cognitive and/or psychosocial disabilities’.189 Article 12 requires States Parties 
to recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with 
others and to take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to 
the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. Thus, the CRPD mandates a 
new approach based on supported decision-making.190 Family have a fundamental role to 
play in providing this support.  In turn, the CRPD places clear obligations on States Parties 
to provide its own support to families and others so that they can fulfil the necessary 
support role for persons with disabilities.191 
 
Conclusion: Finding a Place for Family 
Narrative ‘supplies law with its unreflecting assumptions’.192 Understanding different 
narratives of family in the discourse of mental illness helps to provide a context for a 
normative evaluation of the law’s response. We have identified three relevant narratives in 
                                                 
188 Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right of Persons with Disabilities to Live Independently and be Included 
in the Community CommDH/Issue Paper (2012), 3 available at www.commissioner.coe.int. 
189 M Bach and L Kerzner, A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity (Ontario: 
Law Commission of Ontario, 2010), p 40. 
190 There is ongoing debate regarding whether the CRPD requires supported decision-making  in all instances or 
whether there is still scope for substitute decision-making in some limited cases: A Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the 
Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future?’ (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 429. 
191 See M Bach and L Kerzner A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity (Ontario: 
Law Commission of Ontario, 2010), pp 111-114. 
192 J Benjamin, ‘The Narratives of Financial Law’ (2010) 20 OJLS, 787, 788. 
 37 
this article and examined ways in which these narratives underpin mental health 
legislation in England and Wales and in Ireland.  The individualist approach taken in the 
Irish MHA 2001 derives in part at least from a narrative of family as a threat to the person 
with a mental illness.  Accordingly, the MHA 2001 lacks any legal mechanisms to enable 
families to provide support to patients and fails also to provide support for families.  
Although the MHA 1983 affords some degree of recognition of the role of family, the 
legislation retains an individualist focus.   Family is allowed a role but only if this role is 
mediated through the person of the nearest relative who is chosen not because of his or her 
closeness to the patient but because s/he comes at the top of a statutory hierarchy.  Thus, 
the nearest relative becomes the public face of the private family and the sole point at 
which the interaction between the public world of mental health legislation and the private 
world of family care is allowed to take place.  The resulting framework fails to address the 
real lives and needs of people with mental illness and their families.  For this reason, we 
argue that the approach in both jurisdictions is outdated and should be the subject of a 
normative re-evaluation. 
 
In developing a normative context for reconsideration of the role of family, we advocate 
moving away from the current individualist focus and instead towards a greater 
recognition of the relational or embedded nature of the subject. The conceptual tools 
provided by relational autonomy and vulnerability are, we argue, especially well-suited to 
the challenges faced by mental health law in addressing the role of family.  Relational 
autonomy is helpful not just because it recognises that individuals are inherently relational 
but also because of its transformational potential.  This approach requires that we ask what 
the law can do to develop (autonomy-enhancing) relationships and not simply how the law 
should respond to existing relationships. In the context of mental illness, where family 
relationships are undoubtedly complex and at times strained, this approach moves away 
from existing narratives and offers the potential to develop new narratives of family.   
 
In order for new narratives to develop, both individuals and families need support and this 
support, we have argued, requires a more responsive State and a more sophisticated legal 
framework.  There are, of course, enormous challenges in this.  We have to identify how the 
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State (and the law) can support relationships and, of particular importance in the field of 
mental health, we need to find ways in which State support can be achieved without 
permitting ever greater levels of State control. Nonetheless, we believe that the conceptual 
tools we have discussed here provide the basis for productive ongoing engagement with 
the role of family in mental health law. 
 
